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True identity statements of the form `X = Y’ have a cognitive significance different from that of statements of the form `X = X’.  Another way of making this point would be to say that while, for a normal person, Norma, it is true to say of her that she believes that a = a, it may be false to say of her that she believes that a = b.  Yet, since `a’ and `b’ refer to the same thing, how can this be?  The answer famously given by Frege is that cognitive significance is a function of both reference and what he called `sense’ (Sinn), and that in attitude ascriptions of the form `S øs that p’, the singular terms in the embedded sentence refer not to their normal referents, but to their senses.
In the view of many writers, the postulation of senses does little or no explanatory work:  Faced with a problem concerning the difference in cognitive significance between two true sentences `a = b’ and `a = a’, to say that the difference lies in the senses of the singular expressions is to offer little more than to say that sense is the I-know-not-what that accounts for the difference.  Later writers, some of whom dissociate themselves from the Fregean tradition, have attempted to supply some philosophical backbone to the idea that, in certain contexts, a singular terms refers not to an object, but to (depending on the theory) a mode of occurrence, a guise or an aspect, or a time-slice of that object, one of its ways of being or an alter ego. 
The standard pragmatic approach to these substitutivity problems, by contrast, holds that there is no need to explain the difference in truth-value between a pair of sentences that are alike save for their having different, but co-referring, singular terms because there is no such difference: the two singular terms refer to the same object, the truth-values of the two sentences are the same; it is only our naïve intuitions that inform us, incorrectly, that the sentences differ in truth-value.  In one prominent version of this view, our mistake is to confuse the semantic content of the two sentences with their respective pragmatic implicatures.  The two-fold root of the pragmatic approach is (i) a `direct reference’ theory of singular terms, which received its classic modern defence in Saul Kripke’s Naming and Necessity.  (According to this view, and in contrast to Frege, singular terms do not have sense; they have only reference – some (such as proper names) refer to the same object in all possible worlds, others refer to different objects in different possible worlds.  Thus, in a possible world not too remote from our own, the term `The President of the United States’ refers to Mickey Mouse); (ii) H.P. Grice’s theory of conversational implicature and, in particular, Grices’s distinction between what a speaker’s sentence literally says and what it may convey, suggest or implicate. 
Wittgenstein, as is well known, was no Fregean.  Even in the Tractatus, where he does import a certain amount of Fregean logico-philosophical machinery, he expressly rejects the doctrine that names have sense, and, in his later writings he abandons such technical philosophical apparatus as the sense/reference distinction and argues that sometimes a name may have no `fixed and unequivocal use’; the name can be used without a fixed meaning (PI § 79).  Equally, Wittgenstein is at odds with the pragmatic view sketched above.  As against the two key cornerstones of that position that I identified, he is happy to talk of the meaning of names – or at least of the meaning that a name has in a given context – although his view must be distinguished from a Fregean or a Searlean one (see Stewart Candlish’s paper, this volume).  And, as we shall see, he is dead against the notion of the literal meaning of a sentence and thus could not avail himself of the Gricean distinction between literal meaning and that which is implicated by a speaker’s utterance.  What I want to argue is not just that Wittgenstein would have rejected the two standard approaches to the substitutivity problems, but that a positive alternative emerges from his writings and it is one which I think looks promising.

I  Language and Language-Use
Wittgenstein passed this verdict on his philosophical contemporaries: "The main mistake made by philosophers of the present generation, including Moore, is that when language is looked at, what is looked at is a form of words and not the use made of the form of words" (LA, p.2).​[1]​  Language should not be regarded as a system of signs which latch, in a mechanical way, onto situations (the so-called "calculus" conception (PI § 81) that he had embraced in his early work), but as words used in context, in the performance of various sorts of action, this interweaving of words and action constituting our "language-games" (PI § 7).  The "main mistake" made by Wittgenstein's contemporaries, including his Tractatus self (PI § 23), is, he argues, that they investigated language decontextualized, as a non-spatial and non-temporal structure (PI § 108).  "It  would produce confusion," he says, "if we were to say : the words of the ...sentence ... have a definite sense, and the giving of it, the `assertion' supplies something additional.  As if the sentence, spoken by a gramophone, belonged to pure logic; as if here it had the pure logical sense...  The sentence, I want to say, has no sense outside the language-game" (RPP I § 488).
	Wittgenstein certainly over-states his case and, in so doing, seems to be offering something to which he is officially opposed – a general theory about language.  There may be certain utterances which, were we to hear them out of context, we should have great difficulty interpreting, but this is by no means true of all, or even most utterances.  The malapropism `Sally is very studious, for she never watches television in the evening but always constipates on her homework' is intelligible precisely because, against the background of the rest of the words understood in their normal senses, the muffed one stands out like a sore thumb and the intended word can easily be guessed.  The `normal senses’ alluded to here are the standard, dictionary senses which are preserved across all contexts and which are hence context-independent.  When what a speaker means is heavily dependent on context, we can generally spell out the meaning to make it less so; in other words, we can usually go some way to eternalizing the sentences used. 
	It is tempting to suppose, in the light of this last point,  that communication is possible because we have at our disposal a fund of words the fixed meanings of which competent speakers understand -- "a symbolism used in an exact calculus" (BB, p.25).  But this is altogether to ignore how we actually use words -- not, indeed, in a completely unruly way, but in ways that are highly adaptable to the purposes at hand and to the context in which they are used.  This is not to say that individuals generally use words idiosyncratically, as a private code;  rather, meanings are negotiated between the partners in a conversation – in Davidson’s terms, a “passing theory” particular to those conversationalists comes into play.  Thus (to take an extreme example) the headline in the sports section of the newspaper which read `Supercallygoballisticcelticareatrocious’ was entirely intelligible to readers who, as the writer assumed, were afficionados both of Scottish football and of Mary Poppins, but would have been a mystery to all others.

II  Framing Reports
Parties to a conversation typically possess differing knowledge including differing knowledge about what each other knows.  If conversation is to be co-operative, speakers should make use of the knowledge that they think each other possesses.  So, for example, if I know that you know my neighbour, but don't know that his name is Dirk, I should not report to you that Dirk murdered his dog in those words; I should say to you "My neighbour murdered his dog".  The choice of words is pragmatic -- the words are chosen in a way that takes account of the conversational situation.  I want to argue that all the problems associated with the substitutivity of co-referring expressions can be solved once we pay attention to the pragmatic principles that guide the manner in which reports are framed.  The key to the solution lies in recognizing that one of the complicated aspects of our form of life is that we report events and situations to fellow agents, and tailor our words to the particular capacities and limitations of the particular agents to whom we are reporting.  The pragmatic principles which guide the framing of such reports are subtle, in the sense that they require us to fine-tune our words to the multi-dimensional particularities of different conversational situations, but the most general of these principles -- what I shall call the "Overarching" and the "Perspectival" principles​[2]​ -- are rather easy to state, and their existence is easy to explain.
The Overarching Principle is that speakers should, within reasonable limits, choose those words that will render their reports maximally intelligible to their hearers.  This principle is in line with the Gricean maxim of manner.  It is a defeasible principle since there will be occasions where it might be worth sacrificing a little bit of intelligibility for some other desideratum such as elegance -- prime example: Wittgenstein's Tractatus.  Under normal circumstances, operating within `reasonable limits' involves not bothering to spell things out at huge length just to protect oneself against willful misunderstanding or adolescent logic-chopping.​[3]​  The Perspectival Principle is that, when reporting a propositional attitude of some person one should frame one’s report in a way that mimics, so far as possible, the way that the person reported would report his or her own attitude.

III  Condensed Utterances
One important use of a singular term is to draw the attention of a hearer to some object.  One of the ways I succeed conversationally is if the object to which I intend to draw an audience's attention by my use of a singular term coincides with the object to which the audience's attention is drawn.  Without such coincidence, speaker and audience will be at cross-purposes.  In a conversation, there may be no unique referent of a singular term if speaker and hearer take the term differently.  It is clear, for example that, for a definite description used referentially, the individual to whom the speaker intends to refer may be different from the one to whom the hearer thinks the speaker is referring.  So a circumspect speaker will select a singular term with care if he wishes the hearer to catch his intentions.  He may well use a different singular term for drawing the attention of a different hearer to the same individual.  As sensitive speakers, we defer to the hearer; our singular terms are used deferentially.  For the benefit of my child, I use the phrase "your mum" to refer to the same person I describe to the police as "that woman you wanted to question about the recent shoplifting at Woolworths".  As Urmson (1968, p.118) says, “the supreme consideration in choosing a referring expression is that it should be one which will be successful with one’s audience.  This normally overrides all other considerations of aptness and even of accuracy; when talking to a non-gardener one should always refer to a perlargonium as a geranium.”.  It should be stressed that condensation is the norm rather than the exception.  In Kent Bach’s terms, mostly what we mean is conversationally implicit.​[4]​
Contextual factors frequently intrude in very subtle ways to help fix both reference and meaning.  If I say "He finished the bottle", then what "the bottle" is being used to stand for (an object or its contents) may depend on whether I am talking about an omnivore or a baby.  I can use the name "Chomsky" to refer to the author who inspired that last example (Chomsky 1995, p.23), but when I say "Chomsky occupies two metres on my bookshelf", I am generally referring to his books, rather than recalling the youth whom I put up in my office before he became a famous linguist.  And when I say that I taught Chomsky for ten years, I am referring neither to the man nor to my copies of his books, but to his theories.  We are generally able to use concise sentences rather than convoluted ones because we can rely on our audience, in the particular context of utterance, being able to "fill in" what is missing, so we can achieve clarity and conciseness without sacrificing precision.  Sometimes, such "filling in" requires little more than the mere (mental) adding of a few words; other times, as in Wittgenstein's "Moses" example (PI § 79), a proper reconstruction of the speaker's meaning requires a wholesale rephrasing.  In written language, an interesting condensing device that has emerged recently – actually, it is still emerging -- is a set of conventions for text-messaging by mobile ‘phone.
On one occasion, meant one way, the statement "Moses did not exist" may be true; on another occasion, a quite different statement meant by the speaker in using that same sentence may be false.  It takes great ingenuity (although it comes easily to us) to draw upon mutual knowledge of the preceding conversation, of our surroundings and our beliefs to ensure that the way an audience understands a speaker's concise statement is just the way that the speaker intends it.  So, for example, if we have been conversing about what we both know to be a liberal citizens' committee in Copenhagen anxious to institute an improved civic prostitution service, I may say, truly, "The citizens' committee wants prostitutes to be taught new skills".  The sense of that statement is, of course, quite different from that of the statement I would be making if, using that same sentence, I were speaking about a well known conservative committee in Manila advocating the retraining of prostitutes for some more respectable line of work.  What the phrase "new skills" is being used to refer to is different in each case.  It may be that, in this example, context merely helps the hearer select the intended senses of ambiguous words ("new" as "additional" or "different"; "skill" as "technique" or "expertise").  But context can also be exploited to impose novel sense.  The distance between the tip of a man's nose and the tip of his penis is roughly half a metre, but, in Zbigniew's case, it is several thousand kilometres, since he now  lives in the United States but was circumcised in Poland.  There is enough slack in the rules to allow us to extend the use of `tip' to a detached part, and much verbal humour depends on inventing such acceptable (intelligible) extensions.  Of course, in humour we want creative or imaginative extensions of the extension, whereas in our ordinary reporting, the exploitation of the physical or conversational environment for the purpose of securing understanding tends to be much more systematic and pedestrian. 

IV  Failure of Substitutivity in Simple Sentences
The acid test for any proposed solution to the substitutivity problem is not propositional attitude reports (which offer great opportunities for arcane and epicyclic theoretical manoeuvres), but the kind of "simple" sentences, recently discussed by Jennifer Saul, which do not sustain substitutivity salva veritate.  A virtue of Saul's papers (1997a,b) is that they remind us that, while propositional attitude reports may present particularly tricky cases, the phenomenon of "failure of substitutivity salva veritate of co-referring terms" is present not just in reports of attitudes, but in simpler cases, such as my report of Dirk and his dog.  Since the root phenomenon is the same, any theory which purports to explain failure of co-referentiality but which applies only to reports of attitudes, is wrong.  Consider one of Saul's examples:

(1)	 Lois kissed Superman before she kissed Clark Kent.

One theory to explain why, though (1) is true (since Lois did kiss Superman before she kissed Clark Kent),

(2)	 Lois kissed Superman before she kissed Superman.

is false, is that the rôle of a referring expression is to stand for some temporal phase of its bearer.  But, as Saul shows (1997a, p.104), this proposal runs into trouble with

(3)  Superman is Clark Kent.

for here the temporal phases allegedly referred to are different.  So this theory would say that (3) is false -- the wrong answer.
Suppose that someone, asked to explain what she meant by an utterance of (1) were to reply

(1a)  Lois kissed some one individual when he was doing his Superman thing (wearing the kit etc.) before she ever kissed the same individual when he was dressed as Clark Kent the newspaper reporter.

That would be fine -- the meaning, as Wittgenstein remarked, is what is given in giving the explanation of a meaning -- but it does not follow that we now have a uniform prescription for condensing similar sentences.  To seek or expect one is to betray that “craving for generality” which Wittgenstein thought was a philosopher's disease.  For obviously, in saying what someone meant in uttering

(4)	  Lois slept with Superman before she slept with Clark Kent.

we do not want to suggest that Superman was wearing his kit when Lois slept with him.  A certain utterer of (4) might mean

(4a) On a certain occasion when Lois encountered a guy supermanning, she bedded him.  Subsequently she slept with a reporter whom she knew only as `Clark Kent' (not realizing that it was one and the same guy).

(where, to borrow an idea of Quine’s, “to superman” is “to do the Superman thing”)
Some philosophers, such as Kent Bach (1987), would say that (1) must be false, since Superman and Clark Kent are the same person.  Would we want to say that strictly speaking, they are correct ?  Clearly not -- there is no "strictly speaking" about it -- language itself is not the arbiter of right and wrong.  Linguistic intuitions are not infallible, and they are, to a certain extent, pliable, yet it would be foolish to be receptive to a theory which says that most people do not know how to use their own native language and as a consequence take to be true many statements which are false, and vice versa.  People who know the story say that (1) is true, and they are right to do so.  If Bach buys his daughter a doll that looks like Clark Kent when she had specifically asked for a doll that looks like Superman, she would think it a pretty poor joke were Bach to explain that, strictly speaking, he had bought her exactly what she requested.  Someone who utters (1) with the intention of uttering a truth is not in error and has not misused language in any way.  We use language to say what we want to say, and fail only on rare occasions, for example, when we are mistaken about the common meaning of a word we use.  Here is a typical scenario in which, in using (1), the speaker speaks the truth: Martine and I, having just seen the Superman movie, fall into a dispute over whether Lois slipped her arms around the supersuit and kissed its wearer before or after she slipped her arms round the grey suit and kissed its wearer.  If, in this case, Martine utters (1) then she is right; she says something true.  And neither of us take ourselves to be debating, in effect, the truth-value of (2), even though we both know that "Superman" and "Clark Kent" are names of the same individual.  In her use of (1), Martine intends, and I take her to be intending, something like 

(1a) Lois kissed some one individual when he was doing his Superman thing (wearing the kit etc.) before she ever kissed the same individual when he was dressed as Clark Kent the newspaper reporter.

The (mental) "filling in" required to recover sense (1a) from (1) is obviously quite considerable.  It is foolish to ask “What semantic theory or set of semantic principles establishes that (1a) is the sense delivered by (1)?”  for, in order to show that (1a) was the plausible interpretation in the given situation, we had to tell the story about that situation, mentioning a host of non-semantical facts. 
In other contexts, the use of (1) expresses a falsehood.  Suppose, for example, we know that Millicent has not seen the movie, has received only a garbled version of the plot and, in particular, is unaware that Superman is Clark Kent.  If Millicent now utters (1), we should tell her, correctly, that she has said something false, and would go on the explain that, since Superman and Clark Kent are one and the same person, each Superman-kissing is simultaneous with, is in fact identical to, a Clark Kent-kissing.  In this case, what Millicent is saying, and what we take her to be saying is





(1b')  (E!x)(E!y)(~(x = y) & x supermans & y clarkkents & Lois kissed x before she kissed y)

While (1a) is a spelling out of what both Martine and I mean, (1b) or (1b') spell out what Millicent means.​[5]​ Thus, Sentence (1) is used in different contexts to make different statements with different truth-values, and this is due not to the presence of indexicals or ambiguous expressions in the sentence, but is due to the different circumstances of utterance.  Another point worth noting is that whereas what Millicent is saying in uttering (1)  can easily be represented in first-order logic, with quantifiers ranging over persons, this is not the case with what Martine and I are saying when we utter (1).  For Martine and I know that we are talking not about two different people but about one person and the two different kinds of state in which that person, from time to time, exhibits himself.
Given the context of the conversation between Martine and myself -- where we each know that the other has just seen the film -- it makes entirely good sense for us to use (1) as a convenient abbreviation for (1a).  Although (1a) is more explicit than (1), we would never use it in normal conversation because there are useful and subtle mechanisms, which every competent speaker employs, for engaging audience knowledge of the context in such a way that, though using a short (condensed) sentence, the speaker can be confident that the audience will be able to retrieve the "explicit" meaning.  Now, comparing (1a) and (1), two lessons become clear: First, it is incorrect to say that, when I use (1) in speaking with Martine, I am using “Superman” and “Clark Kent” to stand for one object, for, if I were, then my statement would be false, which it is not.  This case is therefore very similar to the Wittgenstein example we were considering earlier where, for certain uses of "Moses did not exist", it is pointless to ask what object the name "Moses" stands for; second, that the reason we may have had for inclining us to think that we might be able to substitute "Superman" for "Clark Kent" in (1) -- namely that both names stand for the same object -- has now vanished, for, in this case, they stand for no object at all.
What contribution, then, do the names "Superman" and "Clark Kent" make to the meaning of (1) as used by Martine and me?  The answer, in most general and truistic terms, is that they serve the function of helping to ensure that, taken together with the relevant contextual factors, it is meaning (1a) that is yielded in the context in which Martine and I are conversing.  It is very convenient to use a token of the same sentence as an ignoramus​[6]​ like Millicent uses, since Milicent sees the situation in the same way as Lois does (they are both labouring under the same misconception) and it lends a certain vivacity to our conversation if Martine and I can avoid the ponderous (1a) and imaginatively put ourselves into the mind (and mouth) of Lois.  This is rather similar to the excitable way in which some teenagers report what their friends have said.  If a friend says `p’ (where `p’ abbreviates some sentence) then the dreary way of reporting what this friend said would be “She said that p*”, where “p*” results from making the appropriate adjustments to the pronouns, verb inflexions etc. in “p”.  The livelier way is “She was like `p’” where, ideally, the “p” is pronounced in the friend’s tone of voice, or, failing that, in some kooky alternative.
	There are other ways in which we can have linguistic fun when there are two names of one individual at our disposal.  If I say to you

(5) Diana Spencer was quiet and reserved, but Lady Di was the effervescent Queen of Hearts.

then I have said something true.  And the (rather difficult) "spelling out" of (5) which would make my intended sense explicit draws quite differently on context than does the spelling out of (1).  That (5) (as just used by me) is true, and not a contradiction, is proof that the names occurring in it are not there being used to denote a single individual.  But to try to insist that they must be being used to denote something (a sense, a temporal phase, a guise etc.), on the grounds that the logical rôle of a name is to denote, is, again, symptomatic of the philosopher's unhealthy craving for generality.  Natural languages are full of nooks and crannies; all manner of ingenious ways have developed for doing things with words and the supposition that names behave in a uniform manner is wholly without empirical warrant.  The requirement of crystalline purity is only a logician's fantasy (PI § 107).
Although Saul terms her sample sentences which contain no attitude, modal or quotational constructions "simple", they are in fact the most testing ones for any theory designed to cope with the substitutivity phenomenon, for they leave least scope for manoeuvre.  My own suggestion has been that there is no problem, because there is no constraint requiring substitution of "co-referentials" salva veritate in sentences, and that supposing that there is such a constraint betrays a fundamental illusion about the project of semantics -- in fact, it commits the "main mistake" identified by Wittgenstein, that of thinking that the semantics of natural languages is the study of language as an abstract system rather than of words used in a context by speakers.  It is because of proper reliance on contextual factors which the speaker knows will enable his audience to grasp what he means that the speaker frames a statement in the way that he does. The speaker can expect audience uptake if, through previous experience with that, or a similarly placed audience, the speaker can see that his audience uses words and actions in much the same way as he does himself, and catches on to the same clues.  This is, as Wittgenstein puts it, "part of the framework on which the working of our language is based" (PI § 240).  But we are wonderfully flexible, and if we have reason to believe that our hearer does not share our form of life (or does not yet share it as is the case with normal young infants just getting to grips with the ways of the words and the world), then we adapt.  As Davidson says, "if you are pretty sure that somebody is going to interpret you in a `non-standard' way, then you are foolish if you don't speak in a non-standard way" (Davidson, 1993, p.119).
Once we are properly sensitive to the ways in which contextual factors are relied upon to ensure audience uptake, we can always see why a speaker might refuse to substitute a "semantically co-referring expression" for the one he used.  We can see why such a substitution could alter the sense and the truth-value of the original statement.  A speaker of (1), talking to someone else who knows the movie, would refuse to substitute "Superman" for "Clark Kent" simply because he is aware that appeal to context, demonstrative conventions and speaker's knowledge would not allow the audience to retrieve the intended sense (1a) from the resulting sentence.  Put positively, a competent speaker intending to convey the message of (1a), knows that uttering (1) is the succinct way of doing just that when in the presence of a competent and knowing hearer.  One of the reasons why, in the literature on the substitutivity problem, different authors have such wildly differing intuitions about what truth-value a given example-sentence has is that authors are thinking of different contexts in which the sentence is used. 

V  Attitude Reports
Propositional attitude reports are no different from simple statements with respect to the substitutivity problem.  The pragmatic considerations guiding the speaker's choice of words may be complex and are sometimes conflicting, and spelling out the speaker's intended meaning may be tiresome.  Given the subtle pragmatic principles governing a speaker's choice of singular term, there should be no expectation that the substitution of one such term for another, even when in some contexts both terms can be used to pick out the same individual, will preserve truth.
We pointed out earlier that, although linguistic intuitions are not sacrosanct, it is absurd to declare that sentences we use successfully in ordinary discourse for ordinary purposes of communication do not have the meaning we think they have just because some theory tells us that they don't.  For there is nothing more to the sentences having the meaning we think they have other than their having the use they do have in ordinary successful communication.  This seems obvious, and it is curious that a straight thinker like Simon Blackburn has talked himself into believing otherwise.  Blackburn concocts a story about a tourist – let us call him Cedric -- who takes the train up Snowdon and finds the journey disappointing (for it is true that the scenery on that train ride is fairly bland and the slopes are not spectacular).  Next day, however, Cedric gets more ambitious and goes climbing up Yr Wyddfa across Crib Goch.  He thinks it is great and says so, without realising that Yr Wyddfa is actually Snowdon.  According to Blackburn, it is true (but not helpful) to say of Cedric that he thinks that Snowdon is duller than Snowdon (Blackburn, 1984, p.333).  But Blackburn is wrong; it plainly is not true.  One can, of course, envisage the locals sitting in the pub ridiculing Cedric; one of them might say "Cedric thinks that Snowdon is duller than Snowdon", but none of them seriously believes that Cedric would assent to the proposition that there is some object that is duller than itself.  The data to be explained is that, while they might truly say that Cedric believes that Snowdon is duller than Yr Wyddfa, they would not say (because it is patently false) that Cedric believes that Snowdon is duller than Snowdon (unless, as mentioned, they were poking fun).  Cedric himself would not assert "Snowdon is duller than Snowdon" and, in reporting his beliefs faithfully, they must say things as he sees them, unless they are out for crude distortion or a cheap joke.  The obligation to report someone's beliefs from that person's perspective is what I shall call the "Perspectival Principle".  It is a defeasible principle, in that it may be overridden.  And another point to make is that, in respecting this principle, we must sometimes refuse, when reporting an attitude, to mimic the sentence used by the person expressing that attitude.  For sometimes the person may use the wrong words, and if we want to report what his real attitude is, we should use the right words.  Failure to do so is what Joseph Moore (1999) has called "misdisquotation".
As was the case with the "simple" sentences, it is easy to find non-indexical, non-ambiguous sentences used for making attitude-reports which have different truth values when used to make statements in different contexts.  Thus, while

(7)  Lois Lane believes Superman is a reporter.

would normally be taken as false, we can, following Jonathan Berg (1988, p.371), imagine a scenario in which (7) is used to express a truth:  Two people are marvelling at Superman's ability to conceal his identity.  One says to the other, "Look, there's Superman in his Clark Kent outfit; he's incredibly convincing!  Everyone thinks he's a reporter -- Jimmy Olson, Mr. White -- why, even that clever Lois Lane believes Superman is a reporter".  In this scenario, the "spelled out" version of (7) is

(7a)  Lois Lane believes that the guy whom she knows only as "Superman" when he is doing his superheroic thing, but whom you and I know both as "Superman" and "Clark Kent" is a reporter.

Of course, the speaker can avoid this mouthful by relying on his audience's relevant knowledge and their knowledge of Lois' relative ignorance and their knowledge of the devices, either well established or invented "on the fly", which, given this kind of context, permit the shrinking of (7a) down to (7).  In this context, it will be noted, we jettison the Perspectival Principle because, with Superman in full view of us, the most salient perspective is our own.  Similarly,

(8a)  Lois Lane believes that the guy whom she knows only as "Clark Kent" when he is doing his newspaper reporter stuff, but whom you and I know both as "Superman" and "Clark Kent", can fly.

shrinks, all being well, to

(8)  Lois believes that Clark Kent can fly

and, as normally used, is false.
Sometimes to use those words that the person whose attitude we are reporting would use would be at the expense of intelligibility to the reportee, so the reporter changes those words.    If neither you nor Maggie know that Odile is her mother​[7]​ -- let us suppose that both of you think that Catherine is (and know that Catherine's name is "Catherine") -- it would be wrong for me to tell you "Maggie thinks that her mother is tired".  Wrong, both in the sense of being misleading, and in the sense of being false.  For the operative pragmatic principle (in this case the Overarching Principle trumps the Perspectival Principle) dictates how the sentence is to be interpreted -- dictates what statement a speaker, conforming to such principles intends, and what statement an audience should figure him to be intending.  Note that, in this case, the usual means for making the report explicitly de re is not much help.  For, if I say to you "Maggie thinks of her mother that she is tired" then, so long as you think that Catherine is Maggie's mother, you will take my statement to be false and it is moot (undecidable) whether the statement really is true or false.  For decidability and clarity, I should de-condense my statement and say "Maggie thinks, of whom I, but not you, know to be her mother that she is tired".  I may actually put it in this way, rather than simply saying "Maggie thinks that Catherine is tired" because I choose to use this occasion to finally reveal a dark family secret.

VI  How to Make True Attitude Reports
There is a pragmatic principle to the effect that, other things being equal, I should use something close to those words (or a translation of them) that the reported (the person about whom the report is being made) would herself use. We have called this "the Perspectival Principle".  The existence of this principle is easy enough to explain: in reporting people's attitudes one generally wants to say things as they see them, and how they see things is how they would say them if they could (and if words are adequate to the task).  Departure from this principle is usually the result of pressure from what I called "the Overarching Principle" -- to make oneself maximally intelligible to one's audience, i.e. to the reportee.  I can now summarize the prescription for making true attitude reports.  This is a prescription which, I claim, we all follow with almost 100% success.  For reasons of space, I shall just consider cases in which a reporter R is telling his hearer H that some person A (the ascribee) øs that some item has a particular property F.  Let us suppose, further, that (as in all the examples I can think of that are used in the literature) there are just two singular terms "c" and "d" for that item, where it may not be known to all three parties R, A and H that there are both of these singular terms, or that these are two singular terms for a single item.  We shall choose "F" so that, if A øs that Fc and sincerely asserts "I ø that Fc" she would dissent from "I ø that Fd", and vice-versa.
Here, then, is the prescription: If A would sincerely assert "I ø that Fc", then R, reporting to H, makes a true ascription by saying "A øs that Fc" UNLESS framing the report that way would either be unintelligible to H or would give H a false impression; in which case, the Overarching Principle kicks in, and the true report would be "A øs that Fd".  So, for example, if R conveys to H, demonstratively or by some other means that he will be using the name "d" for the item in question, then he must so use it.  This is what happens in the Berg example, where R lets H know that he plans to use the term "Superman" for that guy -- the one who, at the time of the demonstration, is wearing a grey suit and spectacles.  Again, if R knows that H associates the name "c" with something other than the item about which R is reporting, but that H knows the name "d" of that item, then his true report to H will be "A øs that Fd".  That was the case in our report about Maggie, the girl who didn't know the true identity of her mother.
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^1	 .  I use the following abbreviations for Wittgenstein's works:TLP	 1961: Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.BB	1958: The Blue and Brown Books. Oxford: Blackwell.LA	1970: Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Beliefs, ed. C. Barrett. Oxford: Blackwell.PI	1958: Philosophical Investigations (2nd edition), edd. G.E.M. Anscombe and R. Rhees, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell.RPP I  1980: Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume I, ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell.
^2	  .  These principles are elaborated by Urmson (1968), but he terms them `principles of aptness’ and regards the breaching of them as merely inept whereas, in what follows, I shall argue that such breaches can affect the truth-value of utterances.
^3	  .  Thus, in the entry on the scholastic Adam de Wodeham (c.1295 – 1358) in Robert Audi (ed.)’s Encyclopaedia (Audi, 1999) the author writes: “Wodeham’s theological works were written for an audience with a very sophisticated understanding of current issues in semantics, logic and mediaeval mathematical physics’ (p.980).  No doubt, by `current’, the author meant `cotemporary’ but, as mature adults, we cut him some slack, and treat his phrase `current issues’ as convenient shorthand for `issues that were then current’.
^4	  .  See Bach (1994).
^5	 .   (1a) and (1b) are relatively context-insensitive, when compared to (1).
^6	  .  I borrow the term `ignoramus’ and its opposite `cognoscente’  from Barber (2000).  Martine and I are cognoscenti in this situation because we know that Superman and Clark Kent are one and the same person, a fact of which Millicent is ignorant.
^7	  . The example is from Mark Richard’s Propositional Attitudes (Richard, 1990), pp.1-4, but the conclusions I draw are wholly different from Richard’s.
